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ABSTRACT 18 
The lack of association between wealth and fertility in contemporary industrialised 19 
populations has often been used to question the value of an evolutionary perspective on 20 
human behaviour. Here, we first present the history of this debate, and the evolutionary 21 
explanations for why wealth and fertility (the number of children) are decoupled in 22 
modern industrial settings. We suggest that the nature of the relationship between wealth 23 
and fertility remains an open question because of the multi-faceted nature of wealth, 24 
and because existing cross-sectional studies are ambiguous with respect to how material 25 
wealth and fertility are linked. A literature review of longitudinal studies on wealth and 26 
fertility shows that the majority of these report positive effects of wealth, although levels 27 
of fertility seem to fall below those that would maximise fitness. We emphasise that 28 
reproductive decision-making reflects a complex interplay between individual and 29 
societal factors that resists simple evolutionary interpretation, and highlight the role of 30 
economic insecurity in fertility decisions. We conclude by discussing whether the wealth-31 
fertility relationship can inform us about the adaptiveness of modern fertility behaviour, 32 
and argue against simplistic claims regarding maladaptive behaviour in humans. 33 
34 
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1. INTRODUCTION 35 
In an update to Jane Austen’s famous pronouncement of “a truth universally 36 
acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a 37 
wife” ([1], p. 1), Vining suggested that, in contemporary society, it was a negative 38 
relationship between wealth and fertility (the number of children) that was close to “a 39 
universal regularity” ([2], p. 168). Pérusse [3] argued similarly that wealth and fertility were 40 
decoupled in industrial societies, given that wealthier men did not father more offspring 41 
despite higher mating success. These papers have been said to characterise the “central 42 
theoretical problem of sociobiology”: if, as evolutionary theory assumes, individuals are 43 
attempting to maximise their fitness, more resources should translate into a larger number 44 
of offspring, as seen in a range of pre-industrial populations (see e.g., [3–9]). The lack of a 45 
positive relationship between resources and reproductive success also fits with the large-46 
scale pattern of fertility decline in recent history, whereby fewer children are born in more 47 
prosperous economies (e.g., [10]); whatever people are doing with the resources they 48 
acquire so assiduously, they are not, apparently, investing them in having more children. 49 
 50 
Here, we revisit briefly Vining [2] and Pérusse [3], using them as springboard for a survey 51 
of the literature on wealth and fertility among industrial populations (see also [11]). We 52 
present a new review focused exclusively on longitudinal studies that enables stronger 53 
inferences to be made about the links between wealth and reproduction. Finally, we 54 
discuss the extent to which the association between wealth and fertility speaks to the 55 
issue of (mal)adaptive behaviour, and argue for a more biosocial approach to human 56 
fertility.  57 
 58 
1.1. Vining & Pérusse: strong conclusions, weak foundations 59 
Despite receiving frequent citations to this day [12], both Vining’s and Pérusse’s papers 60 
met with strong resistance at the time of publication—something that is immediately 61 
apparent in the commentaries accompanying each article. In Vining’s case [2], the 62 
negative or null relationships he claimed to have established were called into question 63 
by, among other things, the use of unrepresentative convenience samples, fuzzy notions 64 
of social success and status that attempted to capture access to “superior resources”(p. 65 
168; i.e., the use of proxies as diverse as material wealth, occupational status, 66 
“eminence”, and intelligence), and the inclusion of people who had not yet completed 67 
their reproductive careers. Moreover, a number of the relationships Vining found were 68 
actually positive; something that did not, however, lead him to doubt his “universal 69 
regularity”. In Pérusse’s case, similar criticism was directed at the snow-ball sampling 70 
design using Quebecois college students, the composite measure of different status 71 
markers, some rather simplistic analyses (e.g., Bookstein went so far as to call these a 72 
“polemical abuse of statistics”; [3]; p. 286), and some very small sample sizes. Pérusse also 73 
makes the assumption that, in a world without contraception, wealthy men would have 74 
achieved the same number of additional matings as they do today, and that these 75 
would translate into higher fertility; in his view, widespread contraception creates a 76 
mismatch between our past and present environments and disrupts the wealth-fertility 77 
link.  78 
 79 
1.2. The response from Human Behavioural Ecologists 80 
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Despite their flaws, there was a period following the publication of Vining’s and Pérusse’s 81 
papers when Human Behavioural Ecologists seemed willing to entertain the idea that 82 
wealth was not positively related to fertility in Western society (fuelled also by work in 83 
economics, where the relationship had been explored since the 1960s, most notably by 84 
Becker [13]). A good deal of effort was thus devoted to generating evolutionarily-85 
oriented explanations for why resources might not be channelled into offspring, and why 86 
fertility within industrialised nations should be so low (see e.g., [14] for an early review). 87 
These responses came in two flavours: 1) theoretical and formal mathematical analyses 88 
exploring the conditions under which it would be adaptive to limit fertility and why the 89 
wealthy, in particular, should do so; and 2) novel empirical studies of the wealth-fertility 90 
relationship.  91 
 92 
2. THEORETICAL TREATMENTS OF WEALTH AND FERTILITY 93 
A number of theoretical studies have focused on the idea of a mismatch between 94 
ancestral and modern environments, suggesting that modern reproductive strategies are 95 
not fitness-enhancing. Draper [15] and Turke [16], for example, argued that, in pre-96 
industrial populations, the costs of raising a child, in terms of both time and resources, are 97 
dispersed throughout extended kinship-networks whereas, in industrial settings, they fall 98 
on the nuclear family alone because of reduced interactions with kin (see [17,18] for 99 
similar reasoning). Material wealth may therefore be “a less than perfect substitute” for 100 
familial support when it comes to fertility outcomes ([16]; p. 68). 101 
 102 
In addition, it was suggested that humans may be psychologically predisposed to attune 103 
decisions to those occurring in their “reference groups” ([19]; e,g, those of similar 104 
occupational status or education; see also [20,21] for perspectives from economics). 105 
That is, people are argued to attend to, interact and compete with a specific subset of 106 
the population, which leads to biased perceptions of wealth and the actual cost of 107 
raising children. Alternatively, people may be predisposed to copy the behaviour of 108 
other reference groups, specifically those high in prestige [22], which may result in limiting 109 
fertility under the (perhaps mistaken) assumption that such behaviour leads to better 110 
outcomes. Others have argued that, because children face intense competition with 111 
peers to get ahead and there is no real limit on parental investment (i.e., children will 112 
always be of higher quality if they receive continued heavy investment), “run-away” 113 
processes are likely, which favour high expenditure on offspring and, because resources 114 
are finite, result in low fertility [23,24]. 115 
  116 
Another set of analyses considered whether limiting fertility could, in fact, maximise long-117 
term fitness. Several formal theoretical treatments confirmed that reducing fertility could 118 
be adaptive under certain conditions ([25–27], but see [28]). However, there were no 119 
conditions under which the wealthy were expected to lower their fertility more than their 120 
poorer counterparts. Models designed to address this latter point explicitly suggested 121 
that foregoing higher fertility either to invest in higher social status (so decreasing the risk 122 
of mortality during very harsh periods [29]) or to enable intense investment in wealth 123 
accumulation for descendant lineages [24], could increase long-term fitness by reducing 124 
the likelihood of lineage extinction (see also [30]).  125 
 126 
Page 3 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb































































2.1. Embodied-capital theory and the economics of fertility 127 
The most comprehensive and influential examination of the breakdown of the 128 
relationship between resources and fertility, and the rise of very small family size, is 129 
Kaplan’s embodied capital theory [31]. This explicitly combines Gary Becker’s influential 130 
economic theory of fertility (e.g., [13,32]) with life history theory (LHT; e.g., [33]), and 131 
incorporates an evolutionary psychological mechanism to explain why wealth and 132 
fertility have become decoupled across human evolutionary history. In line with classical 133 
LHT, the theory assumes that there will be particular trade-offs between investments in 134 
growth, maintenance and reproduction that natural selection will favour; for instance, a 135 
trade-off between offspring quantity and quality (e.g., [34,35]; one that is also 136 
highlighted in the economic literature: [32]).  137 
 138 
According to Kaplan [31,36], human fertility regulation mechanisms are adapted to the 139 
selection pressures of the learning-dependent, skill-intensive hunter-gatherer foraging 140 
niche (see [37] in this issue for a more elaborate account of Kaplan’s theory). Given that 141 
“wealth” in the ancestral state is comprised of food energy alone, the accumulation of 142 
“embodied capital” under these conditions automatically translates into offspring via 143 
female reproductive physiology. Under these conditions, a model of embodied capital 144 
maximises fitness [36]. When applied to non-hunter-gatherer societies, however, there is 145 
no guarantee that high levels of embodied capital will translate into high fertility for the 146 
following reasons:  147 
 148 
First, our fitness-enhancing preference for resources are argued to be distorted by the 149 
existence of new extra-somatic forms of wealth (livestock, land, money), which, unlike 150 
food resources, are not automatically converted into offspring, and may be 151 
accumulated for their own sake. Extra-somatic wealth seems to be consistently related 152 
to higher fertility in a number of pastoral and agricultural societies (e.g., [3–9]), however, 153 
so it is evident that additional reasons are needed to explain why resources do not 154 
convert into higher fertility in industrialised populations.  155 
 156 
Second, changing pay-offs to embodied capital investments in low-mortality industrial 157 
contexts are argued to generate a more extreme quantity-quality trade-off. That is, 158 
parents prefer a few highly educated, skilled offspring rather than a larger number of 159 
poorly educated, less skilled offspring. This trade-off is well established empirically in 160 
contemporary populations (see [35] for review and [38] in the current issue), and strongly 161 
aligns with Becker’s economic theories. Such trade-offs are offered as an explanation for 162 
why an increase in resources has only very limited (and sometimes negative) effects on 163 
fertility in industrial societies: high-quality children offer greater returns on investment for 164 
wealthier parents than for poor ones [30], hence wealthier parents should expend more 165 
resources per child. Thus, even though, in physiological terms, individuals have the 166 
capacity to produce large numbers of children, the high costs of providing them with the 167 
kinds of embodied capital needed to compete successfully, combined with the 168 
distorting effects of extra-somatic wealth on people’s preferences, results in small family 169 
sizes [31,36] that fall below that required to maximise fitness [36] (note that more recent 170 
work by Kaplan (and colleagues) extend these ideas by integrating both ecological-171 
economic and informational-cultural theories; e.g., [39]). 172 
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3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND THE MANY MEANINGS OF WEALTH 174 
There has also been a continued empirical effort to examine the relationship between 175 
wealth and fertility. These studies differentiate more clearly between the different 176 
components of embodied capital, e.g., education and income, and show that these 177 
have differential effects on fertility. This makes clear that, contra Vining and Pérusse, a 178 
single measure or an arbitrary composite of wealth and status can be misleading: it is 179 
important both to specify clearly what measures are being used, and better yet, to 180 
control for different aspects of wealth (see [40] for a similar plea). Recently, Borgerhoff-181 
Mulder and colleagues [9,41] have suggested that wealth can be divided into three 182 
categories: material, relational, and embodied wealth. Material wealth corresponds to 183 
Kaplan’s extra-somatic wealth, while relational wealth accrues from the nature of an 184 
individual’s social ties. Embodied wealth “encompasses the stocks of health, skill and 185 
productive knowledge embodied in people” ([9]; p. 345) (i.e., it contains elements of 186 
Kaplan’s “embodied capital” and conforms to Becker’s “human capital”).  187 
 188 
Most studies on industrial populations in behavioural ecology focus either on material 189 
wealth (i.e., income) or embodied wealth in the form of education. The effects seen are 190 
remarkably consistent, both within and between the sexes. Income is consistently 191 
positively related to fertility in men, but not in women (e.g., [6,7,42–45]), and seems to be 192 
driven mainly by poor men having a lower probability of marriage and hence remaining 193 
childless (e.g., [7,42,43,46]). The strength of the association between income and fertility 194 
is somewhat attenuated compared to pre-industrial populations, although its magnitude 195 
is higher than the selection gradients typically observed in animal studies (for any trait) 196 
[7]. Education in men is typically negatively related to fertility (e.g., [6,7,42,43]), but results 197 
vary [44,45]. In contrast, higher levels of income and education among women are 198 
associated negatively with fertility (e.g., [6,7,42–44]), although some studies mention a 199 
positive effect of income among highly educated women [27,42]. Overall, there is no 200 
clear indication of a “universal” negative association between wealth and fertility. There 201 
is, however, one factor common to all these studies that makes it inherently difficult to 202 
refute Vining’s conclusions: all are based on cross-sectional data (something that, of 203 
course, also holds true for the studies of Vining and Pérusse).  204 
 205 
3.1. Issues with cross-sectional samples 206 
Cross-sectional samples, while highly informative, preclude any kind of causal 207 
interpretation regarding the relationship between fertility and wealth. Most importantly, 208 
one cannot exclude the possibility of reverse causality: income in later life may reflect 209 
the influence of parenthood, rather than vice versa. Indeed, empirical evidence 210 
suggests that women suffer a significant loss of earnings after the birth of a child (e.g., 211 
[47]; an “opportunity cost” that features heavily in Becker’s US-based economic theory of 212 
fertility). Some of these effects probably reflect the fact that many societies conform to a 213 
“male breadwinner” model, where female income makes only a small contribution to 214 
household income (something exacerbated by early twentieth century employment 215 
policies; in the Netherlands and the UK civil service, for example, women were required 216 
to resign from their jobs when they married). Additionally, women who intend to have 217 
(many) children, or those that have recently entered motherhood, may choose less-218 
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demanding, lower paying jobs [48]. Such effects make it difficult to use income 219 
measured at a single point (usually at the end of the reproductive life-span) to causally 220 
predict the number of children born. Cross-sectional relationships between female 221 
income and completed fertility may also reflect the way that labour markets discriminate 222 
against working mothers, rather than indexing an absence of resources being diverted 223 
into offspring. In contrast, a positive cross-sectional relationship in men could potentially 224 
reflect an increase in income following the birth of a child (e.g., [49]), which in turn could 225 
relate to positive discrimination toward fathers, or an increase in work hours to offset an 226 
increased need for resources. 227 
 228 
Given these concerns, longitudinal data with repeated measures of both wealth and 229 
fertility outcomes can provide more convincing tests of the wealth-fertility link (see [50] 230 
for a similar point with respect to education). Such data can also provide greater insight 231 
into reproductive decision-making because they reflect the serial nature of fertility 232 
decisions [51,52], and because wealth may have differential effects at different parities 233 
(e.g., becoming a parent, having a third child)[11,53]; factors that are ignored when 234 
examining completed family size and wealth in later life. 235 
 236 
4. A REVIEW OF LONGITUDINAL STUDIES 237 
To begin tackling this issue, we conducted a review of the literature on material wealth 238 
and fertility. We focused on material wealth for two reasons. First, it is unclear exactly 239 
what association we should expect between relational or embodied wealth and 240 
subsequent fertility. Although lacking such forms of wealth is likely to be detrimental, it is 241 
unclear whether high levels of embodied and relational wealth should be associated 242 
with high fertility. For instance, how exactly should the prestige or status associated with 243 
being a doctor, net of her resources, predict fertility? In contrast, predictions are much 244 
more straightforward for material wealth: all else being equal, more resources should 245 
lead to higher fertility. Second, the evolutionary anomaly pointed out by Vining and 246 
others is that “superior resources” are associated with lower fertility, hence material 247 
wealth is the focus of most criticisms of an evolutionary approach.  248 
 249 
This decision means that we do not consider education in any detail, despite the fact 250 
that, typically, it is negatively associated with fertility ([54]; see also above). Although 251 
education is often considered a wealth-seeking strategy, it is clear that education 252 
cannot be reduced to this alone: education brings many other individual advantages, 253 
including better health, more autonomy, and a broader perspective on life goals and 254 
opportunities. It is also clear that there is no simple substitution of education for fertility 255 
because societal structures mean that educational norms and opportunities overlap with 256 
(women’s) most fertile years [50]. People who choose education may well intend to 257 
have a family (and even a large family; [55]), but fail to realise their intentions because of 258 
these institutional constraints. Furthermore, there may be differences across educational 259 
strata in reproductive strategies: there is evidence to suggest that highly educated 260 
mothers may possess a particularly intensive mothering strategy [56], whereas women 261 
with less education find more meaning in being a mother [57]. Safe to say, then, that 262 
decisions about education represent a combination of socioeconomic factors and ideas 263 
about the value of education that cannot be reduced to wealth alone or allow 264 
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education to be considered as a straightforward wealth-generating strategy. We do 265 
acknowledge, however, that, high investment in education, and the effect of education 266 
on an individual’s behaviour, may sometimes be maladaptive.  267 
 268 
In industrialised populations, material wealth can be accumulated through labour 269 
market income, intergenerational transfers, and government transfers [58]. For most, 270 
labour market income forms the major determinant of wealth (after consumption 271 
expenditures are covered). Although income is typically used to measures resources 272 
(mostly for reasons of convenience), this need not be an accurate proxy for 273 
accumulated wealth [40], and so we do not assume that high income also signals high 274 
levels of assets. Furthermore, we have shown recently that assets and income may have 275 
a differential effect on the probability of having a first, second child, or third child (and 276 
differently so across ethnicities and sexes; [11]).   277 
 278 
We conducted searches using Web of Science to identify articles examining the 279 
relationship between wealth and fertility. We searched for the terms 280 
wealth/income/wage/social status/assets AND reproductive success/number of 281 
children/fertility AND longitudinal (15 searches in total). This did not constitute an 282 
exhaustive search because other search engines could also have been used, and no 283 
attempt was made to follow up on references included in the articles identified in each 284 
search. Our choice of search engine was, however, an ideal way to identify studies that 285 
were likely to compare closely to those of evolutionary scientists, and with which they 286 
might be familiar. Our review should therefor be seen as exploratory, presenting an 287 
illustrative snapshot of existing longitudinal data on the association between wealth and 288 
fertility. We generated 242 different articles without overlap. We were as inclusive as 289 
possible in our selection process: the only stringently applied criterion was that the study 290 
should contain a longitudinal analysis that dealt with the effect of wealth on subsequent 291 
(proxies of) fertility. Even so, this produced a sample of only 13 (5%) articles with the 292 
relevant longitudinal measures ([59–71]; see the supplementary materials for a 293 
description of these 13 studies and further description of the methods used).  294 
 295 
There was some variation in outcome measures across the 13 articles we reviewed in 296 
detail, ranging from the probability of parenthood, second and third births, all births, and 297 
child mortality (which we included because reduced mortality might be a mechanism 298 
through which wealth can be associated with a higher number of children). It is 299 
important to mention that the sampling design of some studies potentially led to 300 
substantial problems of self-selection [72] (e.g., only sampling individuals who already 301 
had children), which serves to reduce confidence in the results (for further discussion, see 302 
[11,73]). In all cases, the measure of wealth reported was income (whether of 303 
respondents, spouses, or households). Only rarely was information provided on household 304 
assets. The studies covered four Western European countries (Finland, Sweden, Italy, UK), 305 
Russia, Australia and the US. All studies were focused on the second half of the 20th 306 
century, and in most cases, the study period also included the new millennium. Observed 307 
effect sizes tended to be rather small in magnitude (variation in outcomes, 308 
methodologies, and selection of subsamples prevent a straightforward aggregate effect 309 
size). 310 
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4.1. Wealth and fertility are likely to be positively related 312 
We found that the relationship between wealth and fertility was much more likely to be 313 
positive than negative: there were 8 positive, 1 negative and 3 null findings (with the null 314 
or negative results often based on smaller samples, and less sophisticated methods; see 315 
supplementary material). One study showed that income positively predicted the 316 
second birth, but negatively predicted the third and fourth birth ([66]; see [11] for a 317 
similar example). Overall, it seems that economic factors are salient and influence 318 
people’s fertility decisions in line with simple evolutionary predictions regarding the 319 
allocation of resources to reproduction. Despite continued debate surrounding the 320 
association between wealth and fertility, this finding is not particularly earth-shattering: it 321 
is no surprise that people assess their material wealth as part of their decision to have 322 
(more) children. For instance, recent research shows that around 50% of Italian couples 323 
report that they do not wish to have another child because of inadequate income [48]. 324 
This parallels closely the results of an earlier US study, which showed that 55% of the 325 
sample reported they would want more children if money was not a constraint [59](and 326 
this was particularly true for those with lower incomes).  327 
 328 
The more interesting aspect of our review was the way it revealed that: i) a fuller 329 
appreciation of institutional structures is required to understand how and why the relation 330 
between fertility and wealth differs across nations requires [48,61–64,67,69], and ii) how 331 
uncertainty and economic (in)security rather than wealth per se are crucial to 332 
reproductive decision-making [48,62,63,67].  333 
 334 
CONTEXT, HISTORY, AND CONTINGENCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC EVOLUTIONARY 335 
THEORISING 336 
Many studies from our literature review noted that institutional structures led to deviations 337 
from the common predictions of Becker’s economic model of fertility [48,61–64,67,69]. In 338 
particular, there was a lack of support for the prediction that increased female labour 339 
force participation should decrease fertility because the opportunity costs associated 340 
with high wages should lead women to forego parenthood (or at least devalue it relative 341 
to income). When both female labour market participation and childrearing are 342 
facilitated through societal and institutional factors, parenthood is chosen more 343 
frequently (see also [10,74–77]).  344 
 345 
The Swedish studies [61,66,69,71], for example, emphasise how governmental policies 346 
work to increase the compatibility of childrearing and paid labour for women. Beginning 347 
in the early 90s, generous parental leave was introduced, with benefits based on 348 
previous earnings. This can explain why income has a positive effect on fertility for 349 
Swedish women in particular: far from being a hindrance to childrearing, a certain basic 350 
level of income is seen as a prerequisite for beginning a family. At a population level at 351 
least, it is also interesting to note that, despite universal female labour force participation, 352 
Soviet-era Russia was also able to sustain fertility rates comparable to those of Western 353 
Europe. This was argued to be due to the provision of universal health care, day care 354 
and education [62].  355 
 356 
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In contrast to the Swedish case, Australia displays high levels of “institutional 357 
incoherence”, where government policies promote gender equality and opportunity in 358 
the work place, but highly gendered expectations continue to exist in the domestic 359 
sphere (i.e., women are expected to do more domestic labour). This makes it almost 360 
impossible for women to combine work and family life [64], and a negative association 361 
between female earnings would not be surprising. Countries in which there is more equal 362 
division of both market and domestic labour have also seen an upswing in fertility [10,77], 363 
highlighting the importance of domestic labour in reproductive decision-making. 364 
Moreover, a recent study shows that in a period of increasing gender equality, the 365 
association between both male and female earnings and the transition to parenthood 366 
have increased in Denmark [74].  367 
 368 
Thus, understanding the association between material wealth (or at least, income) and 369 
fertility in industrial settings requires a broader understanding of how domestic labour, 370 
and not just market labour, is allocated. More specifically, the institutional incoherence 371 
apparent in many countries means we should not be surprised to find a negative effect 372 
of female labour market income on fertility. When the demands of domestic labour fall 373 
mostly on women, time constraints alone may force women to choose between 374 
domestic versus market labour [78,79].   375 
 376 
The inability of Becker’s economic model to fully capture relevant aspects of 377 
reproductive decision-making across different cultures most likely reflects the fact that 378 
the model is itself highly “culture-bound” and limited to a specific time and place, 379 
namely, early post-war America. Indeed, Becker’s model builds in at its source many of 380 
the features of the classic nuclear post-war American family, including its particular 381 
division of labour (where men are assumed to possess a relative advantage in the labour 382 
market) and stable long-term unions; clearly these features are not universal. If we relax 383 
these assumptions, we can potentially account for at least some of the cross-cultural 384 
variability we see. Yet, even in the US, Becker’s model doesn’t always hold up. For 385 
example, Musick et al [63] found that, contra Becker’s model, female wages were not 386 
negatively but moderately positively related to fertility. Education was strongly negatively 387 
related to fertility, as predicted, but clearly this relationship could not be explained by its 388 
influence on wages, sensu Becker, given the positive effect of income on reproductive 389 
outcomes. In addition, the educational gradient was almost fully explained by 390 
unintended births and there was no major difference in the fertility desires of highly 391 
educated women compared to their less educated counterparts ([63]; see also [55,80]), 392 
although the former do tend to experience a larger gap between intended and realized 393 
births [80]. Thus, the fact that some aspects of Becker’s theory no longer provide a good 394 
fit to behaviour within the US and beyond, suggest that incorporating its assumptions and 395 
predictions into a general evolutionary framework should be treated with a certain 396 
degree of caution. 397 
 398 
5.2 Cultural history and contingent decision-making 399 
Occasionally, historical data are also at odds with economic models of fertility, including 400 
embodied capital theory. During the British industrial revolution, for example, the 401 
introduction of new technologies did not increase the demand for skilled labour (at least 402 
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initially), and work in the labour market was often substituted for education [81]. The 403 
ability of children to engage in paid labour meant they continued to remain productive, 404 
even within the context of increasing industrialisation, rather than becoming the kind of 405 
“consumption goods”, assumed by embodied capital theory. Indeed, Humphries [81] 406 
suggests that, in large part, child labour fuelled the engine of industrialisation in Britain, 407 
allowing for a much faster pace of economic growth than would have otherwise been 408 
possible. Most tellingly, her analysis suggests that it was institutional factors, such as 409 
educational reform and child labour laws (many of which were prompted and 410 
promoted by former child labourers), that changed employment dynamics, and led to 411 
children becoming less productive. At least in the British case, then, complex social and 412 
cultural changes play a crucial role in explaining how and why people made the shift 413 
from large to small families, and this cannot be explained by economic decision-making 414 
at the individual level alone. This suggests that we cannot ignore the contingent facts of 415 
history when attempting to develop models of fertility decline, although this historical 416 
component is not incorporated into current economic and behavioural ecological 417 
models. That is, institutional factors and historical processes are often taken as given by 418 
such models (perhaps envisioned as constraints; see also [51]), allowing individual 419 
reproductive decision-making to be predicted within a specific context. As institutional 420 
context represents a parameter of these models, it cannot, by definition, be used to 421 
predict the emergence of the institutions themselves (such as child labour laws, ideas of 422 
contraceptive use). As these institutional factors are clearly important for understanding 423 
patterns of fertility decline at the population level, it suggests that gene-culture co-424 
evolutionary modelling is also needed to fully understand how and why fertility patterns 425 
shift downwards over time (see also [82] in this issue).  426 
 427 
Finally, there are other features of child-rearing in contemporary industrial societies that 428 
suggest children are not simply “consumption goods” (see also [83,84]), and that 429 
economic considerations alone cannot account for why people do or don’t opt for 430 
parenthood. For example, given the phenomenally high costs and few economic 431 
rewards of parenthood in societies like Italy, the issue at stake is why anyone would 432 
bother to have children at all, rather than why they have so few [85]. Becker’s suggestion 433 
that children provide a form of “psychic utility” provides a superficial answer, but cannot 434 
account for why such utility exists in the first place. It is also apparent that, while fertility 435 
can be analysed as an economic decision, people’s desire to have children is not wholly 436 
explained by these kinds of proximate cost-benefit analyses, instead parents wish to 437 
produce happy and fulfilled children (not simply ‘consume’ them, like other goods), and 438 
this task gives meaning to life in ways that do not map neatly onto notions of human and 439 
embodied capital [83]; people can also find meaning in their lives without children or 440 
wealth, and often actively forego both of these; people sometimes discover that raising 441 
a child is not as fun or fulfilling as they imagined, and this stops them from having more 442 
[86]; there is also strong two-child norm in some societies [87,88] which is argued to 443 
reflect a desire to avoid producing an only child—people who deviate from the norm by 444 
producing more than two children are often those who have two children of the same 445 
sex [88,89], and so wish to “balance” their families in some way (see [11] for further 446 
discussion). We realize that such cases are idiosyncratic, but they do illustrate that a 447 
narrow economic approach cannot adequately account for some of the variation that 448 
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exists. These factors further suggest that we may need to rethink the idea that small 449 
family sizes can be explained, at least partly, by a wealth-seeking/wealth-maximising 450 
psychological mechanism gone astray: it is apparent that people do possess a desire for 451 
children, and that, at least today, our psychology is not attuned solely to the 452 
accumulation of wealth and a desire to maximise resources (as all academics should be 453 
well aware of). More generally, such idiosyncratic behaviours are unlikely to be fitness-454 
enhancing, and their existence therefore requires (evolutionary) explanation. Such cases 455 
are perhaps more easily explained by the diffusion of novel ideas, social learning 456 
mechanisms, and processes of cultural evolution [22,82] than by economic “rational 457 
actor” models of fertility (e g., the ‘invention’ and spread of the idea that having a child-458 
free life is meaningful and fun, is made possible by, among other things, the 459 
development of fully reliable contraception, which itself entails a process of cultural 460 
evolution).  461 
 462 
5.2. Uncertainty and fertility: what is wealth for? 463 
Contrary to the implicit suggestions of Vining and Pérusse that resources do not constrain 464 
reproduction in modern society, it is clear that people do face economic constraints 465 
when it comes to child rearing, and that simplistic claims against evolutionary 466 
approaches are unfounded. It is equally obvious, however, that the effects of wealth are 467 
modest, and that both the mean and variance in the low-fertility high-income 468 
populations covered by our literature review are very low (see supplementary material; 469 
also [11,90,91]). This low variation is suggestive of a two-child norm [88,92], something that 470 
is well established in studies of people’s preferences [87]. Thus, although resource 471 
availability continues to predict fertility levels, it is equally true that the very low fertility 472 
observed is unlikely to be adaptive, and indeed limiting fertility does not seem to 473 
increase fitness in later generations [30]. The super-wealthy are a case in point. Although 474 
the millionaires and billionaires of the Forbes 400 display some reproductive advantages 475 
[2,93], such as higher child survival [93], younger spouses (particularly when remarrying; 476 
[94]), and approximately 20-40% more children than the population average (i.e., about 477 
half a child more), the difference in their wealth is staggering, lying somewhere in the 478 
region of 5000% higher than average [95]. There are, then, literally hundreds of millions 479 
dollars that are not converted into offspring. This throws into sharp relief the slight 480 
reproductive advantage such extraordinarily wealthy individuals enjoy ([95]; a point also 481 
made by Vining [96] in a more recent paper). This being so, it is worth exploring in a little 482 
more detail how the wealthy view their resources, and how this influences fertility 483 
decisions, as a way to gain further insight into why fertility levels might no longer be 484 
fitness-enhancing.  485 
 486 
For example, an ethnographic study by Cooper [97] conducted on 50 families living in 487 
Silicon Valley, California, documents a striking tendency for exceedingly wealthy families 488 
to continue accumulating wealth far beyond their immediate needs. In addition to using 489 
this wealth to furnish a high-consumption lifestyle, it is also revealed to be a strategy for 490 
ensuring an extreme degree of independence from the vagaries of life in modern US 491 
society. One respondent stated he would feel secure—but not rich—only once he had 492 
acquired 10 million dollars worth of investments: this would provide for both his children’s 493 
and his own future regardless of market conditions, changes in health status and other 494 
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“security risks” ([97], p. 118). Cooper [97] suggests this is a rational response to living in a 495 
country where risk-minimisation is now seen as an individual, rather than a societal, 496 
responsibility, and where there is a perceived threat of globalisation to their offspring’s 497 
chances of economic success. One could also interpret such findings in terms of a drive 498 
for relative status within a given reference group (i.e., being a millionaire only makes you 499 
feel ‘poor’ if your neighbours are billionaires), hence their decisions reflect runaway 500 
investments in wealth and child quality (that is, 10 million dollars is not actually needed to 501 
minimize risk). This interpretation is slightly complicated, however, by the fact that 502 
Cooper’s respondents frame their reasoning in terms of the absolute cost of the resources 503 
needed to minimize risk for their entire family across the lifespan. That is, while the 504 
amounts are specific to a particular lifestyle, these appear to be realistic assessments of 505 
the cost of, for example, US health-care, and not some runaway process of keeping up 506 
with the Joneses. 507 
  508 
At the other end of the US socioeconomic scale, those lacking material resources put 509 
their faith in family relationships as a source of security (in line with theories proposed by 510 
Draper [15] and Turke [16] that relational wealth may be key), “downscaling” what they 511 
consider as essential to their current and future wellbeing, given that the accumulation 512 
of material wealth and financial independence simply is not an option. At both the 513 
upper and lower ends of the economic scale, then, it appears that that risk-minimisation 514 
is crucial to understanding why people might limit their fertility: while the very poor 515 
attempt to manage risk in relation to exogenous economic shocks that constrain 516 
reproduction, the very wealthy attempt to eliminate risk altogether, which entails the 517 
generation of endogenous economic constraints on childbearing by assuming 518 
responsibility for all their offspring’s financial risk across a large portion of the life span.  519 
 520 
Many of the studies of our literature review highlighted the importance of economic 521 
(in)security in reproductive decision-making in a similar way [48,62,63,67]. In Italy, for 522 
example, religious influences and a traditional emphasis on family suggest that fertility 523 
should remain relatively high. Instead, Italy has one of the lowest fertility levels in the 524 
whole of Europe. Here, economic policies act against household and family formation, 525 
particularly for women [67]. The job market is characterized by long-term unemployment, 526 
low rates of social mobility and high insecurity, while heavily regulated maternity leave 527 
means that women are more costly to employ than men, which reduces incentives for 528 
employers to take on women [67]. As most Italians aim for a secure economic position 529 
before embarking on long-term choices relating to parenthood, the extended delay 530 
between finishing education (which itself has become greatly prolonged, as in other 531 
Western countries) and finding stable work means fertility is very likely to be postponed 532 
(or even foregone altogether)[48]. The emphasis on accumulating wealth in order to 533 
achieve greater stability and financial security in such populations therefore comes at 534 
cost to fertility—a deep irony in cases where economic stability is sought precisely 535 
because of a desire to produce and provide for a family.  536 
 537 
Musick et al. [63] similarly suggest that the educational gradient in fertility in the US can 538 
be explained in large part by relational instability and economic insecurity. Specifically, 539 
conditions of economic uncertainty lead to a strategy of prolonged postponement of 540 
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childbearing among more wealthy and highly educated women, who perceive a 541 
certain level of income security is necessary before beginning to build their families. In 542 
contrast, women of lower socioeconomic position adopt a strategy of “judicious 543 
opportunism” [98], whereby they do not explicitly plan for children nor control their 544 
fertility, but capitalize on opportunities to build families whenever these arise. As a result, 545 
lower-educated and poorer women tend to experience more unintended pregnancies, 546 
and produce larger families, whereas highly educated women are more likely to 547 
produce smaller families than anticipated, or even experience unwanted childlessness 548 
(due to problems with conceiving at older ages). As with Cooper’s [97] analysis, 549 
American women’s decisions seem more responsive to economic security than to 550 
income per se, with higher education leading to a highly risk-averse reproductive 551 
strategy, and low education to a more flexible strategy. Thus, even within a population, it 552 
is clear that different strata employ different reproductive strategies, making it difficult to 553 
assess trade-offs accurately. Such variability also reiterates the importance of considering 554 
behavioural strategies within, rather than across, reference groups (something argued 555 
cogently by Mace [27,99] in an explicitly evolutionary context; this is also why using 556 
aggregate level data or failing to take account of socioeconomic strata may lead to 557 
false conclusions; [52,100]). Such findings also highlight the difficulty of equating 558 
education to wealth or at least access to resources. 559 
 560 
6. THE COMPLEXITY OF (POTENTIALLY) MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR  561 
The (mostly) positive association between wealth and fertility in our literature review 562 
demonstrates that resources continue to constrain fertility decisions in industrial societies. 563 
We hasten to add, however, that the observed positive association does not lead us to 564 
conclude that contemporary fertility behaviour is therefore adaptive (i.e., fitness-565 
enhancing). Rather, our message is that understanding the interplay between wealth 566 
and fertility among industrial societies is a complex business, and there is a need for a 567 
more detailed investigation of these relationships. The studies we have covered show, for 568 
example, that the neglect of domestic labour in economic models may help explain 569 
some of the observed patterns, as well as revealing that people may seek wealth not for 570 
its own sake, with the “unconscious” or “inadvertent” translation of wealth into fertility in 571 
hunter-gatherer life-ways (and a failure to do so in modern societies), but to ensure the 572 
security of their families in the face of ecological uncertainty [101]. In some cases, this 573 
may amount to the same thing, as the accumulation of wealth obviously ameliorates risk 574 
and uncertain outcomes. Indeed, some economists have even given definitions of 575 
wealth as a “variable that encompasses anything that may help an individual in coping 576 
with adverse occurrences”, highlighting exactly this overlap [48]. 577 
 578 
Examinations of wealth and fertility in industrial settings might therefore benefit from 579 
drawing on those models that deal more specifically with risk and uncertainty (within 580 
both human behavioural ecology [101–103] and the social sciences [104,105]). The idea 581 
that people work toward ensuring their security also grants them greater agency than an 582 
‘unconsidered’ or unconscious desire for material wealth, particularly in traditional 583 
societies where the idea of fertility as largely under physiological control seems to deny 584 
any capacity for foresight or planning (which would be at odds with human activity in 585 
other domains; see also [106]). One could argue that attempting to increase security in a 586 
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world of unpredictable human-manufactured risk could form part of a viable adaptive 587 
strategy but, if so, it would be one that is attuned precisely to the nature of risk in modern 588 
industrial society, and not simply the (slightly misplaced) application of an ancestral 589 
strategy to a new set of conditions. It is also possible, of course, that some evolved 590 
predisposition leads us astray, and that people over-estimate both the level of risk to 591 
which they’re exposed under modern conditions, or the amount of wealth that is 592 
needed to prevent risk, both of which may serve to reduce fertility below the level 593 
needed to maximise fitness. This is, however, an open empirical issue. 594 
 595 
It should be apparent that we are not suggesting the wholesale replacement of a 596 
wealth-maximising mechanism for a risk-minimising mechanism. On the contrary, our aim 597 
is not to advocate one way or the other, but to highlight the possibilities to explore 598 
wealth and fertility from a broader range of perspectives. Indeed, we consider it 599 
inherently unlikely that there will be a simple unitary explanation for why people fail to 600 
maximise fitness in industrialised populations, particularly because such populations can 601 
be so strikingly different from each other. We further believe that such mechanisms need 602 
not represent evolved psychological adaptations, but can also reflect the attunement of 603 
domain-general learning mechanisms to a given set of circumstances (e.g., [107]; 604 
mechanisms that are of course themselves evolved). Our argument is simply that the 605 
inclusion of risk minimisation as a human motivation, and the desire to attain some 606 
control over circumstances, adds an extra dimension to human decision-making that, 607 
currently, is not fully captured by theories that deal with wealth-maximization and status-608 
striving alone. 609 
 610 
Another important point is that the nature of the relationship between wealth and fertility 611 
does not, in and of itself, tell us very much about the nature of evolutionary processes 612 
and their applicability to modern society. The issue is more complicated than that, and 613 
we need to do much more to understand modern reproductive behaviour. As Symons 614 
noted, in his approving commentary on Vining’s original paper: “People in the modern 615 
world fail to maximize fitness in innumerable ways, and there are innumerable differences 616 
between modern and natural environments” ([2]; p. 208). From this, he drew the 617 
conclusion that measuring fitness in modern industrial society, and testing hypotheses of 618 
current adaptiveness, serves very little purpose, arguing instead for a retreat to our 619 
ancestral past and the identification of the evolved psychological mechanisms that 620 
underpin modern behaviour (a view that is broadly held within evolutionary psychology). 621 
Whether such differences are truly “innumerable” is, of course, an open question, and it 622 
may very well be that many evolutionary relevant aspects of human behaviour have 623 
remained fairly constant (e.g., gathering sufficient resources, finding a suitable partner, 624 
raising a child to become competitive in the mating market; see also [19,108]). 625 
Moreover, although it is certainly plausible to suggest that we possess evolved 626 
psychological mechanisms that are not well equipped to cope with industrial 627 
environments, theories highlighting the drastically changed modern environment without 628 
specifying precisely what has changed and why, are of little explanatory value (a point 629 
also made by both Vining [2] and Pérusse [3]; see also [14]). 630 
 631 
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Although we acknowledge that modern populations differ from those in our evolutionary 632 
history (both recent and more distant), we draw the opposite conclusion to Symon’s: 633 
measuring the components of fitness and studying modern-day behaviour are essential 634 
for determining whether or not these “innumerable differences” really do prevent us from 635 
behaving adaptively—after all, if fertility is never assessed, on what basis is the conclusion 636 
of maladaptive behaviour warranted? In the process of measuring fertility-decisions in a 637 
wide range of industrial (and pre-industrial) populations, we undoubtedly learn much 638 
about human decision-making processes (see also [11,19,73]), as well as potentially 639 
being able to identify putative evolved psychological predispositions; we believe such 640 
an approach is preferable to speculative hypotheses about our ancestral past and the a 641 
priori assumption of an evolutionary mismatch.  642 
 643 
The changes seen in contemporary society should furthermore not be viewed as 644 
hindrances to an evolutionary analyses, but as essential components of the human 645 
adaptation that make us unique in the animal kingdom [109].  Burnside et al. [110], for 646 
example, in their analyses of the relation between energy use (indexed by body size), 647 
birth rates and fertility across species and across human populations, were careful to 648 
factor in the amount of extra-somatic energy used by human populations (i.e., the use of 649 
fossil fuels, and the infrastructure required to support these). Their analyses revealed that 650 
the energy use of a woman in the US today was equivalent to the metabolic rate of a 651 
hypothetical 30,000 kg primate, with a fertility rate similar to what one would expect for a 652 
primate of this size [110,111]. In other words, the low fertility observed in industrial 653 
populations is perfectly in line with that predicted on the basis of macro-ecological 654 
patterns of energy use, suggesting that we should perhaps be a bit more cautious in 655 
taking low fertility in industrial ecologies to represent a fundamental evolutionary 656 
anomaly.  657 
 658 
CONCLUSION 659 
Our review illustrates the need for evolutionary analyses to attend more closely to 660 
broader structural aspects that vary across industrial societies in both time and space: 661 
industrial society is not a monolith, and fertility decisions are biosocial phenomena that 662 
cannot be understood on the basis of ahistorical economic optimality models alone. 663 
While we have been critical of Vining’s earlier conclusions, we are more sympathetic 664 
toward his recent argument [96] that human behavioural ecology currently does not 665 
provide any account for why the structure of the labour, or levels of social and gender 666 
inequality, should vary across industrial societies. Instead, certain aspects of modern 667 
society—like low levels of mortality and the high costs of raising children—are simply 668 
taken as given, and analyses then proceed by determining the nature of the trade-offs 669 
made under such circumstances. This is obviously interesting and entirely valid, but it 670 
cannot explain the process by which low levels of mortality and high childrearing costs 671 
arise in the first place. The focus on individual strategies as the unit of interest means we 672 
often fail to appreciate the influence of levels above the individual, and their impact on 673 
behaviour (but see [112,113]).  674 
 675 
The real evolutionary puzzle that remains is why levels of fertility in industrial society are so 676 
low, despite a generally positive influence of resources on fertility decisions. Our study 677 
Page 15 of 28
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/issue-ptrsb































































cannot answer this question, but it does suggest that a greater focus on gene-culture co-678 
evolutionary and niche construction models may pay dividends, as the existence of small 679 
family size norms, and preferences to forego reproduction altogether, are not predicted 680 
by standard evolutionary theory. The sociological literature may similarly be of aid: there 681 
is a rich and extensive body of sociological work that aims to uncover the ways in which 682 
economic uncertainty and gender inequality, along with the impact of globalisation, 683 
influence the human life-course (e.g., [105]) There is also an equally rich literature on 684 
economic history, documenting how and why modern-day economies take the form 685 
they do. Greater attention to the broader social sciences may help further our 686 
understanding of why low fertility norms emerge and persist, and the various routes by 687 
which similar outcomes are achieved. As the editors of this special issue suggest, an 688 
evolutionary perspective is essential for a complete understanding of human fertility 689 
behaviour. We agree, and would simply add that attention to historical processes and 690 
variability in industrial populations can contribute to such a perspective. 691 
 692 
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